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ABSTRACT:
The paper proposes a new approach to the study of Kurds in Turkey, it focuses on 
the new wave of voluntary migration. The article begins with a general overview of 
WKHRULHVRQPLJUDWLRQWRSURYLGHVFLHQWL¿FFRQWH[WWKHQWKHKLVWRU\RIIRUFHG.XUGLVK
migration in Turkey is explained including its potential impact on new migration. The 
WKLUGSDUWRI WKHSDSHULVGHYRWHGWRWKHÀRZRIYROXQWDU\PLJUDWLRQLQWKH7XUNLVK
5HSXEOLFWKHLUFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGVLJQL¿FDQFH7KHIRXUWKDQG¿QDOSDUWGH¿QHVWKH
scheme of voluntary migration in Turkey and some characteristics of Kurdish migra-
tion in 20th century.
As Minoo Alinia (2004: 80) states, „Kurdish Migration is basically involuntary, 
and Kurdish communities mainly consist of war refugees and political refugees (of 
course disregarding the labour migration of the 1960’s)”. However, one can argue 
that since the beginning of 21st century voluntary migration played a substantial 
role in the mobility of Kurds, owing to stabilization in Southern Kurdistan (Au-
tonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq) and improvement of democracy in Turkey. 
Most of the existing studies on Kurdish migration are focused on displacement and 
H[SXOVLRQH[SHULHQFHGE\WKLVJURXSHVSHFLDOO\EHWZHHQDQG,WDSSHDUV
that there is a shortage of works examining voluntary migration and new spatial 
movements of Kurds in the 21st century. This article proposes such types of stud-
ies and will provide some background for them as follows:
Part 1, some theories used in analyzing Kurdish migration and internal-migra-
tion in Turkey are cited providing conceptual framework. Part 2, is devoted to 
5௔7KHDUWLFOHZDVZULWWHQLQWKHVFRSHRISURMHFW¿QDQFHGE\3ROLVK1DWLRQDO6FLHQFH&HQWHUE\
the decision number DEC-2013/09/N/HS3/02014.
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general information on Kurdish forced migration in Turkey and overall spatial 
PRELOLW\3DUWH[DPLQHVLQWHUQDOPLJUDWLRQÀRZVZLWKLQ7XUNH\DQGXQGHUWDNHQ
studies of this topic. Part 4, sketches the characteristics of a potential new wave 
of Kurdish migration in Turkey to categorize the trends of internal migration in 
different decades.
Although some factors on micro and meso level are cited below, the analysis is 
limited to illuminate general settings on a macro-scale.
MIGRATION – A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
According to Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (1998: 283) migration had a key 
role in: colonialism, industrialism and globalization of capitalism. As the migra-
WLRQDIWHUWKHVHFRQGZRUOGZDULQFUHDVHGDQGLWSOD\HGDVLJQL¿FDQWUROHLQFUHDWLQJ
a global market some scholars such as Castles, Miller and Edward Said have called 
WKHWK FHQWXU\ WKH DJHRIPLJUDWLRQ0LQRR$OLQLD   DOVRQRWHV WKDW
some scholars point to some kind of continuity between 15th century colonialism 
and modern international migration as often the majority of modern immigration 
to western countries comes from their previous colonies (see Sassen 1996: 80-85).
For many social scientists and demographers there is an important distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary migration. Although many voluntary migra-
tions are in a way forced by needs (e.g. economic, educational), Abu-Lunghold 
(1988:61-62) underlines that there is still a substantial difference between such a 
migration where the need pulls someone to the host area and an exile when the mi-
grant is pushed from his homeland. As Said (2000: 182) pointed out – involuntary 
migration creates difference not only on relation towards the arriving place but 
also to native areas as refugees may be prevented from returning or their fatherland 
may even not exist anymore. Said has put special emphasis on this expulsion from 
the motherland, theorizing exile as a „state of mind” (see Alinia 2004: 80).
Most theories of voluntary migration concentrate on rational calculation of po-
tential loss and gain posing migration as an economical dilemma. Larry Sjastaad 
(1962) theorized migration as an investment and has shown that when age increas-
es the probablity of migration lowers . This is because potential time for gain owed 
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to migration is smaller. Sjastaad notes that risk of migration venture increases also 
ZLWKGLVWDQFH0LFKDHO7RGDURXQGHUOLQHGWKDWLWLVWKHSUREDELOLW\RI¿QGLQJ
a job that is a dominant factor taken into consideration when choosing a place of 
migration. Oded Stark (1991) and other researchers inspired by him treated migra-
WLRQDVGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQRIULVNVE\IDPLOLHVDVWKH\VHQGWKHLUPHPEHUVWRGLIIHUHQW
locations of varied labour market conditions , (see Chen et. Al 2003; Filiztekin and 
Gökhan 2008: 6). Some scholars have also indicated that it is not a mere inequality 
of salaries and job opportunities but rather a combination of them and income un-
certainties, driving migration from their area (see Ghatak et. al 2006).
Scholars theorizing network migration concentrated on chain-migration as a 
phenomenon connected with the decrease in risk of moving to another location 
due to established social relations with migrants in the place of destination. An 
HDUO\RU¿UVWZDYHPLJUDQWKDVDIUDJLOHVLWXDWLRQEXWODWHUKHFDQFUHDWHDQHWZRUN
of migrants (usualy his relatives or people from the same village or district), help-
LQJWKHPWR¿QGDMREDQGDFFRPPRGDWLRQVHH0DVVH\DQG(VSDQD%DXHU
DQG*DQJ -DFRE0LQFHU± LGHQWL¿HGDULVH LQFRVWVRIPLJUDWLRQ
also with a number of members of a household, but also stressed that the more 
income-earners among them, the greater are potential gains.
Ceren Coban proposes the use of Mike Parnwell’s (1993) multi-level analysis to 
the problem of internal migration in Turkey. Such an approach enumerates micro 
factors which are mirrored in personal decisions, meso-level constituted by socio-
economic conditions and macro level on which large scale development processes 
and transformations occur. Situation of labour market, its requirements and state 
policy towards reinforcement of certain sectors of the market and potential encour-
aging employment are important components on a macro level. Therefore, state 
and local government can support or aim at blocking immigration.
The most often cited push factors of rural areas are: overpopulation, domination 
of non-effective ways of land cultivation (e.g. not mechanized) while other means 
of sustenance are underdeveloped, expected scarcity of land to cultivate due to 
increase in rural inhabitants. These main circumstances create a situation in which 
WKHSHUFHLYHGFKDQFHVRIVXSSRUWLQJDIDPLO\DQGDFKLHYLQJHFRQRPLFIXO¿OOPHQW
are low. The pull factors of large cities provide much more optimistic perspectives 
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RQRQHVIXWXUHOLYLQJ±SHUFHLYHGODUJHGHPDQGRIODERXUYDVWGLYHUVL¿FDWLRQRI
employment, better educational, housing and health-care opportunities.
 Despite other obstacles (such as: family situations, distance, legal restrictions in 
changing a place of living and policy against immigrants) one of the most frequent 
hardships of rural-urban migration (or from less to more economically developed 
areas) is the diffrence of daily costs which frequently force migrants to survive pe-
riods of time under much worse conditions than those which are standard for most 
inhabitants. Economic migrants are usally more tolerant to this urban deprivation 
as it is perceived as a temporal situation on a road to better ways of sustaining one-
self and his or her family (see Coban 2013: 3; Todaro 1969).
Pull factors can also be connected with cultural and social advantages in cities 
that provide a wider range of free time activities, access to art, opportunity to en-
gage in various activist organizations. So called „social advantages” are the result 
of heterogeneity of migrate-society, this notion is understood as different norms 
and interaction schemes that may be perceived by migrants as more open, and, 
bringing chances to easily form relations with other people. It is certain that per-
ception of these cultural and social factors can vary much more frequently (mak-
ing them micro factors rather than meso-level ones) than evaluation of economic, 
educational and health care standards of the place of migration. Individual evalu-
ation of norms and importance of cultural life may be dependent on ones personal 
socialization, ethos, attitude towards tradition and relations with primary groups. 
Other, probably more inluential micro factors are for example: education, amount 
of income in the family, social status, ties with family and social environment, age 
and marital status. As a result of , among others, social obligations to the family, 
young unmarried men generally migrate more frequently (see Parnwell 1993, Co-
ban 2013: 3). Despite complex circumstances of migration on a micro-level, it is 
the political and socioeconomic situation in the host area that determines the treat-
ment and general atmosphere of migrants (see Alinia 2004: 82).
Young Kurds in Turkey can create their ethnic identity based on participation 
in many public organizations, economic, political and artistic ones, which usual-
ly have their centres in Istanbul. Cultivation of their ethnic identity can also be 
practiced through contacts with Kurdish diaspora and transmigrants (por. Khayati 

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DISPLACEMENT OF KURDS IN TURKISH REPUBLIC
A vast proportion of overall Kurdish spatial mobility in Turkey was in fact – as 
pointed out by Alinia (2004: 80) – involuntary. Resettlement was part of a pol-
icy towards gaining control of remote and relatively hard to control areas even 
before the establishment of the Turkish Republic that was based on nationalistic 
SULQFLSOHVVHH$\DWD(PLJUDWLRQWRRNSDUWDIWHUWKH¿UVW.XUGLVKXSULVLQJV
among them notably Ararat ($JLUv),UHEHOOLRQZKLFKZDVOHGE\±Xoybûn – 
political organization formed in Syrian (Western) Kurdistan (see Tejel 2009: 4). 
Internal deportations were the result of Sheikh Said’s (1925) revolt and one of the 
UHDVRQVWKH'HUVLPUHEHOOLRQZDVKHOGLQDQGEORRGLO\VXSSUHVVHG6LQFHWKH
beginning of the Turkish Republic this region was treated as the cradle of subver-
sive ideas and movements that can be overcome only through intensive resettle-
ment and military intervention. The reaction of the Turkish army left an estimated 
10% of the Dersim population dead (including women and children), thousands of 
houses and livestock were burnt (see Bruinessen 1994).
Apart from the state of emergency in Dersim, the following two decades brought 
a relatively peaceful development in the country which included the rise in vol-
XQWDU\PLJUDWLRQLQ7XUNH\$VUXUDOXUEDQPLJUDWLRQLQWHQVL¿HGLQVPDQ\
Kurds migrated to cities due to the change in traditional relations of production in 
their villages. Those changes occured owing to modernization of cultivation, land 
reforms by government and previous resettlement conducted by authorities (see 
Romano 2006: 111-112). In Daivd Romano’s (2006:112) opinion, urban migration 
DQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQVRFLRHFRQRPLFOLIHRILQÀXHQWLDOPLGGOHHDVWHUQFLWLHVDOORZHG
the creation of a Kurdish bourgeoisie and emergence of a new well educated and 
politicized class among them. Owing to the emergence of this new class, relative 
democratization and opening of a political sphere after the post 1960-coup con-
VWLWXWLRQVHYHUDO.XUGLVKDVVRFLDWLRQVDQGPRYHPHQWVÀRXULVKHGWKURXJKRXWWKH
¶VDQG¶VVHHg]FDQ5RPDQR+RZHYHUDIWHUHYHU\
PLOLWDU\FRXSZKLFKRFFXUUHGVXEVHTXHQWO\RQWK0D\0DUFK
and 12 September 1980), Kurdish societies were targeted with arrests and bans. 
This suppression led many activists to emigrate, especially after the 1980 coup, 
that practically resulted in leaving only the PKK on the Kurdish political scene. As 
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the result of tense political atmosphere after the 1980 coup groups of Yezidis living 
in Turkey emigrated abroad (see Kreyenbroek 2009: 33-38).
The expulsion of thousands of Kurdish villagers was part of a counter insur-
gency war doctrine by the Turkish authorities during the 1980s and especially in 
the 1990s. As the remote countryside in the Southeast was perceived by the mil-
itary and authorities as the hotspot of guerrilla warfare training. The resettlement 
plan envisioned eliminating the PKK from rural areas of the Southeast by gaining 
intelligence and local insight as a result of spatial control lead by military opera-
WLRQVDQGIRUPDWLRQRIDSDUDPLOLWDU\ÄYLOODJHJXDUG´7KLVLQLWLDOZD\RI¿JKWLQJ
the PKK included evictions, imprisonment without a trial, burning of villages, 
H[HFXWLRQVGHVWUXFWLRQRIKRXVHKROGVDQGOLYHVWRFNVHH-RQJHUGHQ
*|o'HU7XUJXWg]DOLQPRGL¿HGWKH9LOODJH$FWKoy Kanunu) ena-
ble the hiring of Temporary and Voluntary Village Guards (Geçici ve Gönüllü Köy 
.RUXFXODUÕ7KLVLQVWLWXWLRQDSDUWIURPLQVWLJDWLQJLQQHUFRQÀLFWVEHWZHHQ.XUGV
also created a situation under which villagers were often forced to decide whether 
they want to join the government service or leave their homeland. Moreover, often 
providing help to either village guards or guerillas was punished by each side of 
WKHFRQÀLFWVHH-RQJHUGHQ
The policy of resettlement in Southeastern Turkey (Northern Kurdistan) was in-
VSLUHGE\7XUJXWg]DO¶VLGHDVZKLFKZDVLQFOXGHGLQRQHRIKLVODVWOHWWHUVLQ
to prime minister Suleyman Demirel. He had stated that there should be a plan 
for encouraging people from remote mountain areas to migrate to more densely 
SRSXODWHGORFDWLRQVg]DODOVRXQGHUOLQHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIVWDWHFRQWURORYHUPL-
gration from Kurdish inhabited areas in order to prevent the situation where only 
those having a better economic situation would have migrated leaving the lower 
FODVVHV DQG FUHDWLQJ DQ HQYLURQPHQW RSHQ WR IXUWKHU FRQÀLFW DQG GLVVHQW -RRVW
-RQJHUGHQSRLQWVRXWWKDWDOWKRXJKWKHPDMRULW\RIPHDQVSURSRVHG
E\g]DOKDYHEHHQLPSOHPHQWHGWKHUHVHWWOHPHQWZDVQRWFRQGXFWHGRQDEDVLVRI
deliberate planning of settlement in chosen western provinces and providing the 
necessary facilities for migrants.
/DUJHVFDOHLQGXVWULDOGDPSURMHFWV±*$3*QH\GR÷X$QDGROX3URMHVLLQWKH
VRXWKHUQSDUWRI7XUNLVK.XUGLVWDQDQG'$3'R÷X$QDGROX3URMHVLLWVVOLJKWO\
smaller counterpart and provinces of North Kurdistan, provided knowledge on 
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the area, its inhabitants, their culture and patterns of behaviour, being a source of 
information to improve the control of the state. These industrial projects may also 
pose as a part the policy retaining central power over the Kurdish inhabited lands 
DVg]DOKDGDOVRZULWWHQDERXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIFRQVWUXFWLQJGDPVLQRUGHUWRSUH-
vent evacuated Kurdish people from returning to the southeastern mountains (see 
-RQJHUGHQ
Turkish authorities have been accused of deliberately downsizing the number 
of expelled people in order to diminish the size of the problem of IDP’s (Internal-
ly Displaced Persons) in the eyes of interntional opinion. Estimations of the total 
number of evacuated and displaced people vary widely. Reports from the Turk-
ish Ministry of Internal Affairs place it below 400,000 while the Kurdish Human 
Rights Project activists reported a number between 3 and 4 million a more accurate 
one. Estimates of Turkish social scientists (from Hacattepe University of Popula-
tion Studies and Turkish Economical and Social Studies Foundation – TESEV) 
SRLQWWRDQXPEHUEHWZHHQDQGPLOOLRQ,'3¶VVHH-RQJHUGHQ
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHVXUYH\E\VFKRODUVIURP+DFDWWHSH8QLYHUVLW\RI
forced migrants were from villages and only 20% from urban areas (Jongerden 
.XUGLVK ,'3VPLJUDWHGPRVWO\ WR WKHSURYLQFHVRI0DODW\D$GDQD
0HUVLQ$QWDO\D,]PLU0DQLVD%XUVD$QNDUDDQG,VWDQEXO-RQJHUGHQ
The majority of village evacuations were took place in 1994, at the end of the 
decade the number of resettled areas decreased and after the capture of Ocalan in 
1999 and the end of the state of emergency in southeastern regions in 2002 resettle-
ment stopped being the main policy towards potential danger of guerilla warfare. 
Consequently, forced migration began to play a lesser role giving way to the pull 
factors as substantial agents in Turkey’s internal migration in the new millenium.
Being an IDP throughout the years created problems in everyday life as Turk-
ish authorities, treating Kurdish IDPs as criminals, refused to recognize displaced 
people and also denied them services and social help. Moreover, most of them 
lacked the previously existing social networks that could help them in the destina-
WLRQDUHDPDQ\KDGSUREOHPVLQWKHSURSHUXVHRIWKHRI¿FLDO7XUNLVKODQJXDJHDV
Kurdish was often their sole language in remote mountainous areas. These char-
acteristics put them in danger of under-class deprivation and potential engagement 
RIFULPLQDODFWLYLWLHV$\úH%HWOdHOLNFDWHJRUL]HGW\SHVRISUREOHPVRI
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IDPs as: economic, political, social, relational and security issues. Circumstances 
of their legal recognition improved in the beginning of the 21st century due to Tur-
key’s bid for accession into the European Union. The Law on Compensation for 
Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism (Law No. 5233) 
was proclaimed in 2004.
In april 2005 a strategy framework towards IDPs was released by the Council of 
Ministers – ‘Measures on the Issue of Internally Displaced Persons and the Return 
to Village and Rehabilitation Project in Turkey”. In accordance with this frame-
work an action plan was issued that envisioned delivery of the services to IDPs and 
even an encouragement for return-migration (but only to larger state controlled ar-
HDVUDWKHUWKDQUHPRWHYLOODJHV±VHH-RQJHUGHQdHOLN
The problem of forced migration in 1990’s also remains relevant for the new 
wave of migration. It can affect it in a way that voluntary migration can follow 
previous deportation (as forced migration creates a multi-step migration), new mi-
JUDQWVFDQEHDOVRFKLOGUHQRI,'3¶VDQG¿QDOO\,'3¶VPD\KDYHFUHDWHGDQHWZRUN
that poses as source of support for voluntary newcomers.
INTERNAL MIGRATION FLOWS IN TURKISH REPUBLIC
Although Kurds in Turkey experienced heavy displacement throughout the years 
of Turkish Republic existence, it would be untrue to think that involuntary migra-
tion is the only type of migration undertaken by this group. Even in the decades 
of 1980s and 1990s when forced migration dominated in the country there was 
a substantial number of voluntary migrants. To a large extent the problem of in-
ternal migration in Turkey is a Kurdish problem, as leaving less urbanized and 
HFRQRPLFDOO\PDUJLQDOL]HGUHPDLQLQJDWWKHVDPHWLPHDSODFHRIPLOLWDU\FRQÀLFW
especially in late 80s and 90s) South-East of the country (considered by Kurds as 
the northern part of Kurdistan) was one of the dominating tendencies in popula-
tion movements in Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand Kurdish voluntary 
PLJUDWLRQLQ7XUNH\LWLVYLWDOWRORRNDWWKHPLJUDWLRQÀRZVDQGWHQGHQFLHVLQVLGH
the country.
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Substantial voluntary internal migration took place also in the times of Ottoman 
(PSLUH7KHÀRZRIRI¿FHUVWKDWJDLQHGDQRWKHUVWHSLQWKHEXUHDXFUDWLFKLHUDUFK\
is seen as a major factor in modernizing the country by Kemal H. Karpat (2004). 
His argument is that this mobility have transformed existing local relations and 
FUHDWHGQHZHOLWHV,QWHUQDOPLJUDWLRQÀRZVDOVRSOD\HGDPDMRUUROHLQWLPHVRI
Turkish Republic, changing its population structure and making it an urbanized 
country circa 1985.
According to the census of 2000, over 62% of Istanbul inhabitants were born 
outside of the city, while in the whole country almost 28% of population moved 
to a different province and the annual migration rate was 1,58% (Filiztekin & 
Gökhan 2008). By the 2011 immigration to western and south-western provinces 
even increased: 84% of Istanbul residents were arrivals, 68% of people living in 
the capitol – Ankara were not born there and 39% of Turkish citizens were mi-
grants. This number can be treated as very high as its even above the tripled per-
FHQWDJHRIPLJUDQWVLQDQGDVLJQL¿FDQWULVHWRLQ$NDUDFD
	7DQVHO6XPPLQJWKHVHWHQGHQFLHV$OL7$NDUFDDQG$\VÕW7DQVHO
QRWHGWKDWVLQFHIRUHYHU\¿YH\HDUVDURXQGWRRISRSXODWLRQFKDQJHGRI
their place of living within the borders of Turkey.
 Surprisingly, according to analysis of worldwide macro-scale studies (conduct-
ed by Gallup between 2011 and 2012) made by Neli Esipova, Anita Pugliese and 
Julie Ray (2013), for the International Organization for Migration, 5% or less of 
respondents in Turkey had answered “yes” to the question „Did you move from 
DQRWKHUFLW\RUDUHDZLWKLQWKLVFRXQWU\LQWKHSDVW¿YH\HDUV"´$I¿UPDWLYHDQ-
swers were most frequent in New Zeland (26%) and United States (24%) but even 
Poland was included in the group of countries with a higher rate of internal migra-
tion (between 6 and 10 percent) (Esipova, Pugliese and Ray 2013).
The rapid increase in internal movement that was mentioned earlier, coincided 
with Turkish urbanization. Although one can argue that from the foundation of 
WKH5HSXEOLFXQWLOWKHHQGRIWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU7XUNH\ZDVDGH¿QLWHUXUDO
country with a relatively limited pace of urbanization, after 1945 urbanization was 
PRUHLQWHQVLYHg]FDQ.DUSDW,QWKHVRQO\DTXDUWHUZHUH
7XUNLVKFLWL]HQVOLYLQJLQWKHFLW\LQWKLVSURSRUWLRQZDVKLJKHUEXWVWLOOEH-
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low a half (45%), at the turning of the centuries the majority lived in metropolises 
LQDQGE\PRUHWKDQWKUHHTXDUWHUVLQ
Lack of services, inadequacy or low standard of infrastructure are often cited 
SXVKIDFWRUVEXWDFFRUGLQJWR$\úH*HGLNZKRDQDO\]HGLQWHUQDOPLJUDWLRQ
LQ7XUNH\LQWKH\HDUVWKHVDPHLPSDFWRQWKHGHFLVLRQRIPLJUD-
tion is made because of the pull factors such as: job-opportunities, communication 
and transportation facilities, existing ties with family members or people from the 
same village in the migration area. Psychological distance may be more important 
than physical ones as places where family members, neighbours or friends resided 
are preferred with no regard to proximity. Generally, the three biggest metropolises 
are preferred (which are – Istanbul,Ankara and Izmir).
Differences in gross national product, industrialization, rate of tourism, coastal 
location and socioeconomic development are the factors increasing the probability 
RIPLJUDQWVFRPLQJWRWKHDUHDZKLOHPLOLWDU\FRQÀLFWDQGWHUURULVPKDVDUHYHUVH
HIIHFWVHH*H]LFLDQG.HVNLQ)LOL]WHNLQDQG*|NKDQ
Migrants from ages 15 to 29 constituted more than a half of internal migrants 
in 2000 while the average age of a migrant was on the decrease (Filiztekin and 
Gökhan 2008: 10). Dependent migration and changing residence for marriage 
were the frequent reasons of internal migration for women.
The general information cited above is meant to summarize internal migration 
in Turkey, but the circumstances of spatial mobility were different in different 
decades. In the 1950s the development of industry began to play a substantial role 
in the economy of the country. Industrialization and mechanization of agriculture 
OHDGRQWKHRQHKDQGWRDERRPRIFXOWLYDWLRQDQGLWVHI¿FLHQF\EXWRQWKHRWKHU
hand made landowners more powerful and widened the group of landless and de-
prived people. In the same decade production and usage of motor vehicles were 
popularized and relative liberalization of markets brought development of private 
entrepreneurship. At the end of the decade urbanization increased by 6% (Coban 
2013:4).
In the 1960’s the pace of industrialization grew and transportation facilities 
were developed. The government introduced Import Substitution Industrialization 
policies aimed at strenghening internal economic markets. These policies achieved 
a growth of internal economy but further deepened the inequalities as they were fo-
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cused only on industrial sectors of the economy. This created a demand for labour 
in urban areas but not necessarily providing facilities for newcomers. During this 
decade migrants coming in hope of improving their income and live conditions 
created basic housing structures on state-owned land in the outskirts of big cities 
prompting inhabitants of the city to call these buildings – „built during night” – 
JHFHNRQGXBecause of disparity in income and services between migrants and the 
rest of city’s population, a second market emerges. Since this decade international 
migration from Turkey also increased (Coban 2013:5; Karpat 2004).
$QDO\VHVE\1LOD\(YFLOHWDODQG$\úH*HGLNKDYHVKRZQWKDW
PLJUDWLRQIURPFLW\WRDFLW\VLQFHWKH¶VKDGEHFRPHWKHPRVWSRSXODUW\SH
of internal migration even in the least urbanized provinces. That may be also true 
for the Kurds as the popular pattern of their migrations in the 1990’s forced by 
PLOLWDU\FRQÀLFWZDVDPXOWLVWHSIURPWKH6RXWK(DVWWRVRPHFLW\FORVHUWRWKH
region but situated usually in a more western part of the country, and from that city 
to other urban areas located at a further distance, often Istanbul). In the period of 
VRPHXUEDQWRUXUDOPLJUDLWRQDSSHDUHGZKLFKPD\EHH[SODLQHGE\WKH
worsening economic situation in the cities (see Gedik 1996).
In the beginning of 1980s almost half of the population lived in the cities (45%). 
Studies on the phenomenon of migration carried out by Bilal Ciplak (2012) and 
$\úH%HWOdHOLNVKRZWKDWGXULQJWKHVDQGWKHVRIWKHWKFHQWX-
ry, the wave of migration took place in Turkey, which in contrast to the previous 
RQHVEHWZHHQZDVHQIRUFHG7KLVPLJUDWLRQZDVUHODWHGWRFRQÀLFW
between the PKK and the government of the Republic of Turkey. Consequently, 
many Kurds were forced to leave south-eastern agricultural regions and move in-
side the country. Apart from the dominating push factors, such as lack of security 
and enforced migrations, voluntary migrations also occurred – these are related to 
the so-called pull factors, such as better economic conditions, educational oppor-
tunities and higher quality of medical care in Turkish metropolises (Ciplak 2012: 
:KLOH YROXQWDU\PLJUDQWV FRXOG UHO\ RQ KHOS EDVHG RQ WKHLU UHODWLRQVKLSV
with people coming from the same region of Turkey (KHPúHKUL), people who were 
forced to migrate were not provided with such assistance during their adaptation 
to life in big cities. During 1995-2000 there was an increase in rural to urban and 
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decrease in urban to urban migration, as a result of the resettlement policy in the 
Southeast see Eryurt and Koç 2012).
3UHYLRXVO\GHVFULEHGLQWHUQDOPLJUDWLRQÀRZVLQ7XUNH\LQDGGLWLRQZLWKQHZ
the migration of the 21stcentury can be summarized as proposed migration waves 
depicted on the table below.
NEW WAVE OF KURDISH MIGRATION IN TURKEY
Considering that the government of Turkey eventually abstained from the policy 
of obligatory migrations at the end of the 90s of the 20th century, it was foreseen 
that young migrant Kurds will be voluntary migrants, who decided to change their 
place of living mostly because of economic and educational reasons. Owing to 
democratization connected with the Turkish EU bid and substantial growth of the 
economy in the country, there was a further increase in the internal migration rate 
in the country in the 2000s.
Urban to urban migration remains the dominant type of migration, but at the 
VDPHWLPHWKHXUEDQL]DWLRQUDWHJUHZLQWKH¿UVWGHFDGHRIWKHVWFHQWXU\&RQ-
temporary voluntary Kurdish migrants can study (or complete a part of their stud-
ies e.g. undergraduate) in one city and then move to another (as was the case with 
some of my respondents in Istanbul).
News studies on migration and trans-nationality underline the possibility of eth-
nic group’s functioning and preservation of symbolic culture even under condi-
Table 1. Internal-migration !ows in Turkey
Source: Author’s compilation
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tions of radical spatial separation from the land traditionally inhabited (ref. Khaya-
ti 2008: 24-28). Social processes connected with the development of new ways 
of communication with native villages (tur. PHPOHNHW) will also take place among 
Kurdish migrants.
Changes in migration to the Istanbul province may serve as an illustration of 
PLJUDWLRQJURZWKVLQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHQHZPLOOHQQLXP,QWKH¿UVWGHFDGH
of the 21st century, migration to Istanbul has increased very quickly – it reached 
its peak between 2010-2011 (450 thousand migrants), and then, it decreased to 
384,535 registered migrants (TurkStat 2013). This data coming from the Turk-
LVK6WDWLVWLFDO,QVWLWXWHFRYHUHGVWDWLVWLFVRIWKHRI¿FLDOLQVWLWXWLRQFDOOHGÄ$GGUHVV
Based Population Registration System” (Turkish shortcut ADNKSS), while the 
QXPEHURIPLJUDQWVZLWKRXWUHJLVWUDWLRQFRXOGVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVHWKHWRWDOQXP-
ber of migrants.
It is also important to note that while some provinces are popular places of mi-
gration (6 out of 81 provinces make up a third of country’s population) other are 
GHSRSXODWHG±RQO\RISHRSOHERUQLQ%D\EXUWdDQNÕUÕDQGQRWDEO\7XQFHOL
(formerly Dersim, inhabited by a Kurdish Alevi majority) still live in the same 
province (Akaraca & Tansel 2014). Negative net migration of Southeastern (or 
1RUKWHUQ.XUGLVWDQUHJLRQVLPSOLFDWHWKDWWKHUHLVVWLOODQRQJRLQJPLJUDWLRQÀRZ
from these areas. As shown in the table below regions of Southeastern Anatolia, 
Middle-eastern Anatolia and Northeastern Anatolia are all characterized by nega-
tive net-migration for the period of 2012-2013.
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CONCLUSION
Kurds experienced severe forced migration in the Turkish Republic throughout the 
20th century but they also participated in waves of voluntary migration. Substan-
WLDOSRSXODWLRQÀRZVFKDQJHVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHDQGUHODWLRQV.XUGVZHUHDOVRDSDUW
of that process. In the 1950s and 1960s Kurdish migration to urban areas and their 
education in universities allowed the emergence of new political activists. In the 
1980s and 1990s due to military struggle with the PKK and rise of policy in evac-
uations from Kurdish inhabited villages, forced migration was dominated spatial 
mobility in the country. After the end of the resettlement policy in the 2000s migra-
tion and urbanization continued, owing to economic growth and relative democ-
ratization of the country in the beginning of the new century. As illustrated by 
statistics showing depopulation in the southeastern regions (Northern Kurdistan) 
these new movements may constitute another wave of Kurdish migration.
Table 2. Net-migration in the regions of Turkey during 2012-2013.
Source: TurkStat 2014
FRITILLARIA KURDICA. BULLETIN OF KURDISH STUDIES | NO. 7-8/2015 52
Although educational and economic pull factors seem to play a major role for 
these new migrants, they can be also affected by displacements in previous dec-
ades being children of IDP’s or IDP’s themselves who decided to change place of 
WKHLUOLYLQJ1HZFRPHUVPD\DOVREHQH¿WIURPVRFLDOQHWZRUNVFUHDWHGE\,'3¶V
Taking into consideration criterion of exile and relation with the motherland un-
derlined by Edward Said, some of the new migrants may visit their parents and 
family having lost contact or being unable to enter their place of birth (as it could 
have been burnt down in 1990s). Other new migrants may freely travel between 
their city or village and migration destination. Some of the migrants may stay in 
ZHVWHUQFLWLHV MXVWEHFDXVHRIHFRQRPLFUHDVRQVZKLOHRWKHUV IHHO WKHEHQH¿WRI
more social freedoms. Nevertheless, contributing to social life of their new places 
of living, and being able to participate in Kurdish organizations, these new mi-
grants may in the future change social structure in Turkey again, constructing new 
political groups. For these reasons studying this new group appears to be vital for 
modern scholars of social sciences.
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